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Rejoinder to ‘The myth of
concordance’: a response to
Armstrong
Fiona Stevenson & Graham Scambler
University College London, UK
Armstrong presents our original article as based on two arguments, firstly
that the trust patients have in their doctors has declined in recent years, and
secondly that it follows from this that as concordance assumes open
communication between doctors and patients it is now becoming imposs-
ible to achieve. This is an over-simplification of our argument. We examine
concordance against the background of changes in society, focusing in
particular on challenges to trust, and argue that concordance is being
espoused at a time when the prospects of its accomplishment may be
reducing. Rather than achieving the open and honest exchange of views
typically regarded as necessary for concordance, it seems possible that
communication between patients and practitioners may be distorted, not
least because patients feel trust in their practitioner has diminished. Rather
than arguing, as Armstrong does, that concordance is impossible to achieve,
we highlight possible pitfalls associated with putting the model into practice.
Trust
Armstrong neither accepts our definition of trust nor agrees that it has
diminished. He appears to contend that the case for or against declining
trust cannot be made empirically; then he opts for the latter. We point to
evidence of diminishing trust in the professions and in expert systems in
general, not just medicine, in addition to phenomena such as the increase
in litigation against the medical profession. This may indeed, as Armstrong
suggests, indicate easier access to legal redress, although it is likely that
such an increase would be associated with more than just its availability.
His denial of a golden age of trust is a red herring. Our argument is that
notions of expertise are changing and unthinking paternalism is on the
retreat, particularly in the light of various health scandals widely reported
by the media as well as the medical press, which are likely to have affected
the way in which medicine is perceived. Armstrong argues that evidence
of a diminution of trust in medicine in general cannot be taken as evidence
of a diminution of trust at the level of the individual relationship between
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doctors and patients, yet surely he cannot be arguing that relationships
between patients and practitioners operate in a vacuum and are unaffected
by factors in wider society?
With regard to the relationship between trust and communication, we
are not arguing that there is a simple relationship between trust and good
communication, but rather that trust is necessary for effective communi-
cation since people are unlikely to feel comfortable sharing their under-
standings and beliefs if they do not feel they can trust their practitioner to
respond sympathetically. Moreover, concordance will not be possible if
patients and practitioners feel unable to trust information from the other
party. A decline in trust is likely to increase the challenges for achieving
concordance.
Concordance
The article is positioned so as to open up a debate about the feasibility of
concordance in practice. It is not, as Armstrong appears to have read it, a
prediction of what will necessarily happen. We raise the possibility that a
move from compliance to concordance – one which is in part ‘political’ or
rhetorical – may in practice result in a shift from open strategic action to
concealed strategic action, and significantly to systematically distorted
communication. We do not as Armstrong suggests ‘insist’ that this will be so.
Armstrong points to the relationship between shared decision-making
and concordance, although he fails to highlight the principal difference
between the two, namely that patients do not have to take an active part
in decision-making for concordance to occur, while this is a necessary aspect
of shared decision-making. Thus concordance allows for greater flexibility
for patients to decide on their levels of involvement on individual occasions,
allowing for the inclusion of people who may not desire, or feel comfort-
able with, such a responsible role in the consultation.
To conclude, the aim of the article is not in Armstrong’s words, ‘to
present a romantic and idealized view of the potential of concordance and
then to claim this dream has gone’, but rather, again to quote Armstrong,
to place concordance ‘in a wider context that would allow better under-
standing of its claims’. The difference between our position and
Armstrong’s hinges on the interpretation of the concept of a wider context.
Armstrong appears to see the wider context as relating to the history of
other academic models of decision-making; in contrast, we perceive the
context to relate to changes in the wider society. A final point: it was no
more our intention to write as ‘Habermasians’ than it was presumably
Armstrong’s to respond as either a Foucauldian or an ironic and playful
health services researcher. 
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